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Abstract
Background: The World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) stands to
significantly reduce tobacco-related mortality by accelerating the introduction of evidence-based tobacco control
measures. However, the extent to which States Parties have implemented the Convention varies considerably.
Article 5.3 of the FCTC, is intended to insulate policy-making from the tobacco industry’s political influence, and
aims to address barriers to strong implementation of the Convention associated with tobacco industry political
activity. This paper quantitatively assesses implementation of Article 5.3’s Guidelines for Implementation, evaluates
the strength of Parties’ efforts to implement specific recommendations, and explores how different approaches to
implementation expose the policy process to continuing industry influence.
Methods: We cross-referenced a broad range of documentary data (including FCTC Party reports and World Bank
data on the governance of conflicts of interest in public administration) against Article 5.3 implementation guidelines
(n = 24) for 155 Parties, and performed an in-depth thematic analysis to examine the strength of implementation for
specific recommendations.
Results: Across all Parties, 16% of guideline recommendations reviewed have been implemented. Eighty-three percent
of Parties that have taken some action under Article 5.3 have introduced less than a third of the guidelines. Most
compliance with the guidelines is achieved through pre-existing policy instruments introduced independently of
the FCTC, which rarely cover all relevant policy actors and fall short of the guideline recommendations. Measures
introduced in response to the FCTC are typically restricted to health ministries and not explicit about third parties
acting on behalf of the industry. Parties systematically overlook recommendations that facilitate industry monitoring.
Conclusion: Highly selective and incomplete implementation of specific guideline recommendations facilitates
extensive ongoing opportunities for industry policy influence. Stronger commitment to implementation is required to
ensure consistently strong compliance with the FCTC internationally.
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Background
The World Health Organization (WHO) Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) [1] stands to
significantly reduce tobacco-related morbidity and mor-
tality by accelerating the adoption of a comprehensive
range of evidence-based policy instruments by signatory
countries [2–7]. However, the extent to which States
Parties to the Convention (Parties) have implemented
specific commitments varies considerably. In 2014,
WHO reported that 61% of reporting Parties had intro-
duced complete smoking bans, and only half required
pictorial warnings on tobacco products [8]. Civil society
organizations (CSO) have consistently identified tobacco
industry political influence as the key cause of weak
FCTC implementation [9–14]. This is strongly sup-
ported by document based studies of tobacco companies’
political activities which illustrate their success over sev-
eral decades in weakening, delaying, and preventing the
introduction of public health measures [15–18]. News
reports and academic studies of contemporary industry
efforts to prevent implementation of the FCTC indicate
that these risks are continuing [10, 13, 14, 19, 20]. In
recognition of this, Article 5.3 of the FCTC – a highly
innovative provision and the first of its kind in an inter-
national treaty - aims to address barriers to strong im-
plementation of the Convention associated with tobacco
industry political activity [7, 8, 21, 22]. The Article re-
quires Parties to insulate the development and imple-
mentation of public health policies from tobacco
industry influence [23]. Guidelines for Implementation
of Article 5.3, published in 2008 [24], contain a number
of recommendations (8 general and 34 specific) specify-
ing how Parties should meet their obligations under the
Article, which primarily focus on enhancing govern-
ments’ capacity to monitor the industry’s political activities
and curb its insider political strategies (see Additional
file 1: Table S1) [24]. In 2015, WHO reported over two-
thirds of reporting Parties had taken steps to prevent the
tobacco industry from interfering with tobacco-control
policies [8]. Whilst this data suggests a significant increase
on the 2012 reporting cycle [8], it only outlines whether
Parties have taken some action under Article 5.3, and thus
provides no indication of the strength of Parties’ efforts
[21, 22], in terms of the number of recommendations
acted upon (selective implementation), or the extent to
which discrete recommendations are acted upon (incom-
plete implementation).
By combining data from reporting Parties with a wide
range of other documentary data, this paper quantita-
tively assesses selective implementation of Article 5.3
guidelines, evaluates the strength of Parties’ efforts to
implement specific recommendations, and explores how
different approaches to implementation expose the policy
process to continuing industry influence. Beyond this
specific evaluation of Article 5.3 implementation, the
wider purpose of the analysis is twofold: to provide a more
detailed understanding of the continuing risks to health
policy from industry political activity and inform efforts in
other policy sub-systems - such as climate change, alco-
hol, and food policy - to minimise corporate political
influence.
Conceptual approach
Our analysis is based on the premise that selective and
incomplete implementation of specific guideline recom-
mendations provides residual opportunities for the indus-
try to engage in political activity. By residual opportunities
we refer to the unregulated administrative space created
by selective and incomplete implementation, which either
leaves existing political strategies unaffected or permits to-
bacco companies to adapt their strategies to take advan-
tage of gaps in implementation (hereafter opportunities
for policy influence unless stated otherwise). This assump-
tion reflects a finding common to both the political sci-
ence and public health literatures: corporations select
political strategies with reference to the institutional and
policy contexts in which they operate [25–31]. We seek to
map the potential for opportunities for policy influence
against a conceptual framework developed from studies
on venue shopping [32–36], and corporate political activ-
ity based primarily on analyses of internal tobacco indus-
try documents [16, 17].
Venue-shopping describes the practice of seeking out
decision-making venues where social actors can best
press their case for specific policy preferences [32, 33].
Internal document studies suggest that tobacco companies
seek out alternative venues to supersede or circumvent
health ministries (typically the lead department on FCTC
implementation and a “veto point” for tobacco industry
political activity [32, 33, 37–39]) with a view to exploiting
different priorities of decision-makers in different fora
[40, 41]. We adapt the well-established distinction in
the literature, between horizontal and vertical venue-
shopping, to differentiate between two types of oppor-
tunities for policy influence. Vertical opportunities arise
along various levels of the policy-making process (e.g.
government departments, legislature), while horizontal
opportunities arise across sub-units within a given level
of government (e.g. across different government depart-
ments) [32, 42, 43].
Studies of industry political activity highlight five other
tactically-based opportunities that tobacco companies
can use to acclimate to altered politico-institutional con-
ditions, which derive from the heterogeneity and plasti-
city of tobacco industry political activity [16, 17]. The
first are functional-opportunities which originate from
tobacco companies’ capacity to trial qualitatively differ-
ent techniques to optimise policy influence. These can
Fooks et al. Globalization and Health  (2017) 13:12 Page 2 of 20
work as alternatives to other techniques, in conjunction
with them (such as voluntary marketing codes or youth
smoking initiatives, which can be used to reinforce indus-
try lobbying), or as direct substitutes (such as corporate
social responsibility initiatives to gain informal access to
difficult-to-reach policy élites) [17, 27–29, 44–46]. The
second relate to agent-based opportunities, which derive
from tobacco companies’ practice of using different actors
either to optimise the credibility-leveraging effects of third
parties, or because they are excluded from specific policy-
making venues [17]. The third concerns tobacco com-
panies’ capacity to politically innovate and adapt pre-
existing techniques by changing their policy focus. In
practice, these focus-shifting opportunities are primarily
reflected in tobacco companies’ efforts to exploit govern-
ment concerns over the illicit tobacco trade. This involves
the use of strategic partnerships - historically used in the
context of youth smoking - to facilitate access to policy
élites and embed themselves in policy-making networks
relevant to tobacco taxation [47–50]. Fourth, studies on
tobacco companies’ efforts to shape trade and investment
agreements [51–53], and embed cost-benefit analysis and
risk assessment into policy decision-making [46, 54], dem-
onstrate tobacco companies’ involvement in venue-cre-
ation. This involves the establishment of new forms, or
levels of political governance (policy-making), which are
not covered in the guidelines. Finally, informal methods of
government implementation through uncodified, working
norms may facilitate temporal opportunities for policy
influence by allowing industry actors to take advantage
of changes in political administrations or personnel
over time.
For the sake of concision, our analysis of residual oppor-
tunity structures is illustrative, rather than exhaustive.
Opportunities for policy influence do not represent exclu-
sive categories. Tobacco companies, for example, may trial
different techniques in different policy-making venues by
deploying third parties. In such cases, opportunities for
policy-influence are functional, venue and agent-based.
Equally, tobacco manufacturers typically partner revenue-
raising ministries with respect to the illicit trade, an op-
portunity which is both focus-shifting and venue-based.
Nevertheless, we present the various residual opportun-
ities for policy influence that arise from selective or
incomplete implementation as discrete categories. Fur-
ther, in our quantitative analysis of selective implemen-
tation, we exemplify the different forms of opportunity,
rather than provide a comprehensive account of the full
range that theoretically persists. Likewise, our thematic
analysis of the strength of implementation of specific
recommendations focuses on proximate venue and
agent-based opportunities that arise in relation to the
specific political technique targeted by the recommenda-
tion in question. Finally, we leave discussion of continuing
opportunities facilitated by gaps in the guidelines to the
conclusion.
Methods
Article 21.1 of the FCTC requires Parties to submit peri-
odic reports to the Conference of the Parties through
the Convention Secretariat on implementation [55].
WHO’s reporting template provides Parties with an op-
tion to designate (yes or no) whether they have measures
in place “protecting public health policies with respect
to tobacco control from commercial and other vested
interests of the tobacco industry” [56]. Parties can also
provide details on measures taken in accordance with
Article 5.3, and any progress on implementation since
the last reporting period [56]. In addition, parties are
invited to submit answers to additional questions on im-
plementation [57].
At the time of analysis, there were 179 Parties to the
FCTC. We downloaded reports for 167 Parties from the
WHO database between October 2014 and February
2015 (reports from 11 State Parties were not accessible,
1 related to the European Union and was excluded for
consistency of comparisons). Reports not in English
were translated using Google Translate. Parties whose
languages could not be translated (n = 12) were excluded.
Of the remaining 155 Parties (nAfrica = 36; nAmericas = 28;
nAsia = 49; nEurope = 42), 104 (67%) answered yes to
whether they had undertaken measures in accordance with
Article 5.3 in their latest report, 92 included additional
narrative detail, and 19 submitted answers to additional
questions.
Data collation
The analysis drew upon a range of sources: Parties’ com-
mentaries in their periodic reports on measures taken in
accordance with Article 5.3; tobacco control legislation,
regulations, codes of practices, decrees made available in
the WHO party reporting database, and an online collec-
tion of legal and administrative documents maintained by
the International Legal Consortium and Campaign for
Tobacco-Free Kids (http://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/);
data on the governance of political financing collated by
the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance [58]; World Bank material on the governance
of conflicts of interest in public administration [59] and
the United Nations Economic and Social Council on im-
plementation of the International Code of Conduct for
Public Officials [60]; existing studies on lobbying regula-
tion [61–66]; reports by CSOs on industry interference in
policy-making [67, 68]; and emails to contact officers
named in Party reports.
Emails were sent to all 104 Parties that had reported
taking some action under Article 5.3. Emails contained 7
general questions seeking further information on Article
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5.3 implementation covering, for example, the specific
methods used to put recommendations into effect. In 27
of these emails, supplementary questions sought clarifi-
cation on specific points raised in the narrative sections
of Parties’ reports. Emails were translated into Parties’
official languages using Google Translate with the English
version also included below the translated copy. Nine re-
sponses were received from the first batch of emails.
Follow-up emails were sent to all Parties that had not
responded, repeating the original questions and asking for
any further documentation. These second emails gener-
ated 6 further responses.
Data analysis
We evaluated the strength of Article 5.3 implementation
with reference to two indicators which provide a basis
for exploring residual opportunities for policy influence:
a) the number of specific recommendations acted upon
by each Party (which provides a basic method for explor-
ing functional opportunities for policy influence); and b)
the strength of specific measures undertaken compared
to specific guideline recommendations (which provides a
basis for exploring venue, functional, agent, focus-shifting,
and temporal based opportunities). This evaluation in-
volved two types of in-depth analysis: a cross-referencing
exercise (undertaken by JS and GJF) between measures
undertaken and specific guideline recommendations; and
an interpretative analysis (undertaken by JS and GJF) of the
most commonly implemented recommendations aimed at
identifying conceptual themes relevant to the strength of
specific measures carried out. For both exercises, we de-
fined implementation in terms of formally approved (but
not necessarily in effect) policy instruments (codes of prac-
tices applicable to public and elected officials, administra-
tive measures, and primary and secondary legislation) as of
January 2015; and uncodified working norms (hereafter col-
lectively described as measures unless otherwise stated).
We define working norms to be in place when a party
claims to implement a recommendation (or set of recom-
mendations) methodically, or successfully takes ad hoc ac-
tion, consistent with a recommendation in the absence of a
formal policy instrument. Where relevant we distinguish
between the two in the interpretative analysis.
For the cross-referencing exercise JS and GJF inde-
pendently read the collated data for measures which
broadly corresponded to specific guideline recommenda-
tions. Many recommendations combine several discrete
measures. Parties were given a score of one for each rec-
ommendation partially or fully acted on and zero where
measures were not implemented (with the exception of
prohibitions on tobacco sponsorship limited to promoting
or inducing the use of tobacco products which were coded
as zero). We assigned a score of zero where Party reports
appear to incorrectly claim that a specific recommendation
has been implemented in a law or regulation and where
implementing measures recommend, rather than require,
officials to act in accordance with a recommendation.
Ten recommendations were excluded from the analysis
(leaving a total of 24 recommendations) to take account
of our interest in efforts to reduce the impacts of indus-
try political activity and provide a reliable framework
for comparison between Parties: four of these recom-
mendations (4.1, 4.2, 5.1 and 5.5) are broadly defined
and overlap with others; one (5.4) centres on enforce-
ment; three (8.1-8.3) are concerned with state-owned
tobacco enterprises (the majority of which have now
been privatized [69]); and two (7.1 and 7.3) relate to
state subsidies. We also disregarded sections of discrete
recommendations which do not directly relate to indus-
try political activity (see aspects of recommendations
1.1 and 5.2 in Additional file 1: Table S1) [24]. The data
were entered into an Excel spreadsheet. Scoring was
discussed at regular intervals to ensure consistency and
reach consensus on divergent views.
The interpretative analysis applied the techniques of
thematic analysis outlined by Guest, et al. [70]: concep-
tual coding, theme development, systematic conceptual
comparison, and conceptual explanatory conclusions
[70]. GJF read and coded the data for relevant themes.
Coding was inductive and emergent and informed by
the terms of specific recommendations (particularly
composite recommendations which urge Parties to im-
plement a number of discrete measures), the literature
on tobacco industry political activity [16, 17] and venue-
shopping [32–35]. Reports were downloaded into QSR
NVivo 10 and specified measures were micro-coded for
conceptual ideas relevant to the capacity of the measure
to limit industry interference in health policy-making.
Coding was discussed at regular intervals with JS to en-
sure consistency and reach consensus on divergent
views. When coding was completed, the codes were re-
examined for conceptual coherence and clarity and ex-
amined for relationships among them.
The study has several weaknesses which may under-
state the strength of implementation. First, Party reports
represent a poor source of data. WHO’s reporting tem-
plate does not provide in depth guidance on how guide-
line recommendations should be reported on. Some
Parties include irrelevant information, suggesting poor
understanding of Article 5.3. Both factors may result in
Parties failing to report measures consistent with Article
5.3. Second, the relatively low response rate to our email
queries (likely to have been exacerbated by our reliance
on Google Translate), combined with our focus on docu-
mentary data, is likely to underrepresent the extent of
implementation achieved through uncodified working
norms. Third, not all World Bank data on the govern-
ance of conflicts of interest in public administration is
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publicly available. We sought to take account of this by
conducting internet searches for legal instruments (in-
cluding codes of conduct) for Parties not in the World
Bank dataset. Nonetheless, the findings are likely to
underrepresent the extent to which Parties have codified
recommendations 4.3-4.10. Fourth, the study did not
review existing freedom of information laws. Despite re-
search indicating that they represent poor tools for
accessing information on lobbying, either because con-
tacts are not documented (and, therefore, the data does
not exist) or because of exemptions concerning com-
mercially sensitive information [66], in some countries
these may provide CSOs with access to information con-
cerning industry-government interactions in accordance
with recommendation 2.2. Finally, we did not systemat-
ically examine implementation at the regional or local
levels, which potentially provide important opportunities
for policy influence in federal systems of governance.
The study was approved by Aston University’s Languages
and Social Sciences ethics committee.
Results
Overview of compliance and implementation
Methods of implementation
Implementation is primarily passive. It is achieved through
existing policy instruments introduced independently of
the FCTC which govern conflicts of interest in public ad-
ministration, political financing, and transparency in
lobbying and which reflect recommendations 4.4, 4.6, 4.8,
4.10 and 4.11 (see Additional file 1: Tables S2 and S3,
Figs. 1 and 2). Active implementation, which involves pur-
poseful action to implement the Article, is typically codi-
fied in policy instruments that reflect specific guideline
recommendations and focus on managing the behaviour
of policy actors. Some Parties have also created general
legal duties which aim to minimise industry involvement
in health policy-making. Where this occurs, Parties com-
monly reproduce the wording of Article 5.3 alongside
other, more targeted, measures (Djibouti [71], Mongolia
[72], the Philippines [73]). However, Ukraine’s main to-
bacco law [74] potentially creates a power to challenge
demonstrable industry influence (as opposed to industry
political activity) by giving health protection priority over
“financial, tax, and corporate interests of economic sub-
jects” [74], whilst Panama has taken an intermediate
approach by empowering the Ministry of Health to
establish a commission with responsibility for recom-
mending, instituting, and monitoring compliance with
the general guideline recommendations [75]. Other
Parties have also introduced broad, industry-focused
duties. Gabon’s recent tobacco control law [76], for ex-
ample, requires the industry and related third parties to
conduct themselves in a responsible and transparent
fashion. Finally, some Parties forgo codification by either
introducing working norms that reflect specific recom-
mendations (see Additional file 1: Tables S5, S8, S9) or by
making general, uncodified commitments to act in
accordance with Article 5.3. In relation to the latter,
Colombia, has adopted the protection of public health
policies from industry interests in its public health plan
[77], whereas the Netherlands claims to “act within the
spirit of the guidelines” [78] on issues such as industry
government interactions and involvement of the industry
in tobacco control policy [78].
The basic design features of some of the above ap-
proaches to implementation can limit their impact on
Fig. 1 Frequency of Implementation by Recommendation (for all parties in sample)
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industry opportunities for policy influence. Active im-
plementation, for example, is commonly restricted to
governing the behaviour of health officials and tobacco
companies (see, for example, Additional file 1: Tables S5
and S9), which sustains horizontal and vertical venue-
based opportunities for policy influence. Equally, imple-
mentation that focuses exclusively on operationalising
specific recommendations fails to take account of the
industry’s capacity to innovate politically (see Conclu-
sions). General and industry-focused duties may offset this
effect; future-proofing policy-making against innovation
by giving policymakers and civil society actors greater
scope to contest new forms of policy influence. However,
uncodified general commitments are more open to being
rescinded by new political administrations - creating
greater temporal opportunities for policy influence - and
are likely to be more difficult to enforce. This interpret-
ation finds some support from a recent legal summons
initiated by the Youth Smoking Prevention Foundation in
the Netherlands, which claims that Article 5.3 is routinely
ignored [79, 80].
Strength of implementation
Party reports underestimate the number of Parties that
have taken some action to implement Article 5.3. One
hundred and four (67%) [nAfrica = 23(64%); nAmericas =
17(61%); nAsia = 36(73%); nEurope = 28(67%)] Parties in
our sample report to have taken steps to implement Art-
icle 5.3. However, misreporting is extensive, reflecting
poor understanding of Article 5.3 and limited awareness
of existing policy instruments consistent with the guide-
line recommendations. Twenty-eight Parties include
some information unrelated to Article 5.3 in the relevant
narrative section of their reports, whilst 31 Parties report
no action despite having measures in place relating to
conflicts of interest in public administration and finan-
cing of political parties which reflect one or more guide-
line recommendations. One hundred and twenty-eight
(83%) [nAfrica = 28(78%); nAmericas = 21(75%); nAsia =
41(82%); nEurope = 38(90%)] have measures in place
which are consistent with Article 5.3 and its guidelines
once misreporting is taken into account.
Despite the fact that more Parties have taken some ac-
tion under Article 5.3 than suggested by WHO reports,
effective implementation of the Article is generally weak.
Additional file 1: Tables S2 and S3 outline the total
number of recommendations acted on by all Parties in
the sample (Additional file 1: Table S2) and by those that
have taken some action in accordance with Article 5.3
(Additional file 1: Table S3). The data indicate that only
16% of the recommendations reviewed have been imple-
mented (Additional file 1: Table S2). The percentage
only rises to 20% when Parties that have not taken steps
in accordance with Article 5.3 are excluded (Additional
file 1: Table S3). Simple frequency data indicate that de
minimis implementation, where Parties implement a
small number of recommendations, is relatively wide-
spread and implementation generally is highly selective.
38% of Parties that have taken some steps in accordance
with Article 5.3 have implemented ≤3 specific recom-
mendations, whilst just under 83% (nparties = 106) have
introduced less than a third (n < 8) (Fig. 3). In fact, only
8 Parties, just over 6%, have introduced more than half
(n > 12) (Fig. 3).
Parties that fail to implement specific recommendations
create an unregulated environment for the specific forms
Fig. 2 Percentage Implementation by Recommendation (for parties that have taken some steps in accordance with Article 5.3)
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of industry political activity those recommendations seek
to address. De minimis implementation potentially has
more fundamental effects. First, it creates a permissive en-
vironment for functional opportunities for policy influence
where key techniques of political activity escape regulation
altogether. For example, implementation of recommenda-
tion 2.2 can partially offset the effect of failing to restrict
government-industry interactions in accordance with
recommendation 2.1 (Additional file 1: Tables S1 and
S3, Fig. 2), by ensuring that interactions that do occur
are transparent. However, in practice recommendations
2.1 and 2.2 are commonly implemented in tandem (Africa,
25%; Americas, 67%; Asia, 62%; Europe, 38%), with the ef-
fect that industry-government interactions are completely
unregulated in most cases (Africa, 89%; Americas, 59%;
Asia, 76%; Europe, 69%). Second, selective and de minimis
implementation facilitates agent-based opportunities for
policy influence by permitting tobacco companies to make
use of third parties without effective scrutiny. This is a
consequence of low rates of implementation of recom-
mendations 5.2 and 5.3, which urge Parties to introduce
rules of disclosure and reporting requirements for organi-
zations affiliated to the industry or acting on its behalf (see
Additional file 1: Table S1, S2 and S3, Figs. 1 and 2).
Awareness raising of industry political activity
(recommendations 1.1, 1.2, and 6.1)
1.1 Parties should…inform and educate all branches of
government and the public about the….need to protect
public health policies for tobacco control from commercial
and other vested interests of the tobacco industry and
the strategies and tactics used by the tobacco industry
to interfere with the setting and implementation of public
health policies with respect to tobacco control.
1.2 Parties should, in addition, raise awareness about the
tobacco industry’s practice of using individuals, front groups
and affiliated organizations to act, openly or covertly, on
their behalf or to take action to further the interests of the
tobacco industry.
6.1 Parties should ensure that all branches of government
and the public are informed and made aware of the true
purpose and scope of activities described as socially respon-
sible performed by the tobacco industry.
Recommendations 1.1, 1.2 and 6.1 urge Parties to
undertake awareness raising activities to increase pan-
governmental and public surveillance of industry political
activity and ensure a whole-of-government approach to
minimising the industry’s opportunities for policy influ-
ence by changing officials’ behaviour towards their polit-
ical activity. Recommendation 1.1 represents a general
provision aimed at encouraging Parties to educate govern-
ment departments and publics about the nature of in-
dustry political activity. Recommendations 1.2 and 6.1
specifically encourage Parties to extend awareness rais-
ing to tobacco manufacturers’ use of third parties and
corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives to influ-
ence policy. In practice, variations in how awareness
raising activities are organised (relating to their method
of delivery, target audience and content), and the insti-
tutional contexts in which they take effect, are likely to
have a significant bearing on their effectiveness.
Parties have trialled six methods of awareness raising
(Additional file 1: Table S4): pan-governmental admin-
istrative circulars (circulars); meetings, workshops, pre-
sentations, and consultations (meetings); training based
measures (training), in which awareness raising is em-
bedded in the training of civil servants and legal ad-
visers of government ministries; intra-governmental
advocacy by health ministries (or tobacco control agen-
cies) aimed at providing intelligence to other parts of
government targeted by the industry in the context of
specific policy conflicts (intra-governmental advocacy);
ongoing campaigns by national, regional, and local
health officials aimed at highlighting the policy value of
protecting health policy from industry interference
(campaigning); and mass media campaigns which use
local television advertisements, newspaper articles,
radio call in shows, and websites to raise awareness of
industry interference among the general public (public
Fig. 3 Number of Specific Recommendations Implemented by Party (parties that have taken some steps in accordance with Article 5.3)
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awareness raising). These activities address four broad
audiences: officials from central and local/regional gov-
ernment and government agencies; elected representa-
tives; non-state actors, specifically civil society
organizations (CSOs), journalists and community leaders;
and the general public (Additional file 1: Table S4).
It is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the im-
pact of different methods of awareness raising as few
parties monitor their effects on officials’ behaviour (but
see [81]). Awareness raising activities through the mass
media may help build political support for stronger re-
strictions on, and systems for monitoring industry political
activity. Equally, the timely and targeted nature of intra-
governmental advocacy may help to develop working
norms among policy actors that are consistent with the
aims of Article 5.3. Brazil reports that intra-governmental
advocacy by Comissão Nacional para Implementação da
Convenção - Quadro para Controle do Tabaco (CONICQ)
(a national commission for FCTC implementation com-
prising representatives from across the federal govern-
ment) in the context of specific policy conflicts has been
effective in countering industry lobbying of non-health de-
partments [82]. However, research on the effects of educa-
tion on professionals’ behaviour in the workplace raises
doubts about the effectiveness of approaches, which are
not ongoing, learner-centred, and interactive [83, 84] such
as one-off meetings and the passive dissemination of in-
formation through pan-governmental circulars. The ef-
fectiveness of meetings will also be dependent on whether
participants have sufficient institutional capital to influ-
ence policy-making norms (as a result of seniority or pro-
fessional expertise), and are drawn from across public
administration. Officials from departments whose institu-
tional priorities are governed by the current revenue gen-
erated by the tobacco industry and tobacco consumption
(such as finance ministries and customs and excise depart-
ments, or departments responsible for brokering inter-
national trade and investment agreements), elected
representatives, and legal advisers to government de-
partments, all play important roles in shaping health
policy and, therefore, frustrating tactical adaptation by the
industry [41]. Reports typically exclude this information.
The quality and relevance of information provided in
awareness raising activities is also relevant to their ef-
fectiveness in controlling tactical and functional adapta-
tion. Much industry political activity is opaque, which
poses acute challenges to policymakers. The industry’s
reliance on third parties, for example, makes it difficult
for public officials to identify industry interests and re-
spond accordingly [16, 17, 85, 86]. Likewise, industry
CSR programmes and liaison with governments over the
illicit trade in tobacco often appear unconnected from
policy influence [27–29, 44, 45, 87], which can obscure
the political risks of engagement [48, 88, 89]. Finally, the
poor evidential quality of tobacco manufacturers’ sub-
missions to public consultations is buried beneath non-
scientific and misleading epistemological techniques
which create a parallel ‘scientific’ discourse that is diffi-
cult to unpick without extensive forensic examination
[90, 91]. Given the growing use of mandatory regulatory
impact assessments [46, 92] which place administrative
obligations on policymakers to give serious consider-
ation to industry representations concerning the relative
costs and benefits of health policies, officials are increas-
ingly required to engage with and effectively disaggregate
these techniques if health policies are to be shielded from
an important form of functional adaptation not explicitly
covered by the guidelines. Effective awareness raising must
therefore outline the range of techniques and actors used
in industry political activity, specify the identity of actors
with links to tobacco manufacturers, and provide detailed
accounts of the techniques manufacturers’ use to provide
a scientific veneer to poor quality information: issues,
which are likely to vary between states and policies [17].
There is little evidence to suggest that these issues are sys-
tematically addressed in practice.
Finally, institutional contexts influence the effective-
ness of awareness raising by setting limits on the prac-
tical value of policymakers’ increased mindfulness of
industry political activity. Thus, the extent to which
awareness raising can help policymakers identify third
parties acting on behalf of the industry is highly
dependent on effective procedures for monitoring the
industry’s political actions or requiring tobacco manu-
facturers to make transparent their political activities,
which few Parties have acted on. Equally, awareness
raising will have little practical effect in the absence of
administrative levers to put enhanced awareness of
industry political activity into effect – such as adminis-
trative codes aimed at limiting industry-government
interactions, industry involvement in policy-making, or
conflicts of interest.
Government and industry interactions (recommendations
2.1 and 2.2)
Restricting access to policymakers
2.1 Parties should interact with the tobacco industry only
when and to the extent strictly necessary to enable them
to effectively regulate the tobacco industry and tobacco
products.
By encouraging Parties to restrict industry actors’ ac-
cess to public officials, recommendation 2.1 aims to
shield public and elected officials from poor quality and
misleading industry information and reduce opportun-
ities for industry actors to cultivate more co-operative,
higher trust relationships with policymakers [28]. The ef-
fectiveness of restrictions depends on the extent to
which they take account of the methods used by the
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industry to lobby officials which rely heavily on third
parties [93, 94] and focus on departments concerned
with revenue generation, intellectual property consider-
ations, and trade and investment relations [16, 17, 40,
48, 51, 52, 89, 95, 96] and heads of state [96], as well as
health ministries.
Restricting access to non-health departments is particu-
larly important given that they can have a stronger voice
in government [40, 48] and fewer reservations over the
value of industry information [29, 40, 41, 48, 51, 95, 97].
Norway’s Ministry of Finance, for example, liaises with the
industry to obtain information on illicit tobacco sales and
smuggling, which it uses to set tax levels despite doubts
over the accuracy of such information [98–102]. Differing
perceptions of the reliability of industry information
among business and finance related departments may
reflect their relative remoteness from transnational net-
works, such as the Framework Convention Alliance,
which seek to highlight the poor quality of industry infor-
mation. Moreover, routine interactions between industry
actors and officials from these departments is also likely to
facilitate more trusting, co-operative relationships which
further strengthens perceptions of the credibility of indus-
try information [103]. In practice, restrictions rarely seem
to be extended to interactions with third parties or with
officials beyond health ministries (Additional file 1:
Table S5), implying that (horizontal and vertical) venue
and agent-based opportunities for policy influence persist
even in jurisdictions with constraints on government-
industry exchanges.
A number of Parties have also developed detailed ad-
ministrative rules, codifying how industry-government in-
teractions should take effect (Additional file 1: Table S6).
In addition to restricting industry actors’ capacity to shape
the agenda of meetings with officials [29] the existence of
such rules limits the potential for informal, unregulated,
exchanges (in fact, Philippines’ rules advocate that all
“non-mediated exchanges” should be avoided [104]) and,
by creating obstacles to industry access, provides a deter-
rent to industry lobbying. Their practical impact, however,
is moderated by their limited institutional reach and
the fact that they rarely apply explicitly to third parties
(Additional file 1: Table S6).
Transparency of industry-government interactions
2.2 Where interactions with the tobacco industry are ne-
cessary, Parties should ensure that such interactions are
conducted transparently. Whenever possible, interactions
should be conducted in public, for example, through pub-
lic hearings, public notice of interactions, disclosure of
records of such interactions to the public.
Although many measures aimed at making government-
industry interactions transparent apply across govern-
ment, recommendation 2.2 is weakly implemented. Few
measures make high-quality, easily accessible informa-
tion available for public scrutiny and, consequently, are
unlikely to significantly affect existing opportunities for
policy influence.
By giving politically influential actors direct, low-cost ac-
cess to high quality information, transparency protocols
that give observer status to CSOs potentially represent the
most effective method for reducing industry influence
(Additional file 1: Table S7). However, this approach is
rare. Most Parties seek to implement recommendation 2.2
by placing details of industry-government communica-
tions in the public domain. Variations in this approach
produce wide disparities in the accessibility and quality of
information available for public scrutiny. Few measures
give the public unrestricted access to minutes of interac-
tions that reveal the substance of discussions (Additional
file 1: Table S7). Most Parties simply publish basic details
of meetings (such as dates, those in attendance, and broad
topics discussed). This is likely to impede effective moni-
toring by requiring CSOs to submit requests for minutes
under FOI laws, which not only increases the costs of
monitoring, but also commonly contain exemptions
which preserve the confidentiality of industry-government
interactions [105]. Even where confidentiality exemptions
are subject to public interest tests FOI may still represent
a weak instrument for enhancing transparency. In the UK,
for example [106], where confidentiality exemptions in
FOI legislation are subject to a public interest test, minis-
ters are not required to declare meetings with lobbyists if
they take place in their private time or constituency roles
[107], and the Regulatory Policy Committee, a strategically
important body in assessing the costs of regulation
[108], is not covered by the Freedom of the Informa-
tion Act (2000). Just as importantly, transparency pro-
tocols that focus on meetings exclude correspondence
and telephone conversations. Further, in some cases
details of meetings are only available on request
(Additional file 1: Table S7). Finally, many Parties’
protocols, neither apply to interactions across govern-
ment nor to third parties acting on behalf of the
industry (Additional file 1: Table S7): gaps which are
likely to assume greater practical significance if restricted
access to policymakers within health departments cause
industry actors to shift the focus of lobbying to other
departments.
A number of Parties (Austria, Cyprus, Estonia,
France, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Slovenia) re-
quire publication (under certain circumstances) of the
names of persons consulted in respect of draft legisla-
tion. However, comprehensive legislative footprints are
rare (see Additional file 1: Table S7 with respect to
Latvia and Poland) and only apply to draft laws intro-
duced before legislatures rather than to policy-making
generally [109].
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Partnerships, self-regulation, and legislative drafting
(recommendations 3.1-3.4)
3.1 Parties should not accept, support or endorse partner-
ships and non-binding or non-enforceable agreements as
well as any voluntary arrangement with the tobacco in-
dustry or any entity or person working to further its
interests.
3.2 Parties should not accept, support or endorse the
tobacco industry organizing, promoting, participating in,
or performing, youth public education or any initiatives
that are directly or indirectly related to tobacco control.
3.3 Parties should not accept, support or endorse any
voluntary code of conduct or instrument drafted by the
tobacco industry that is offered as a substitute for legally
enforceable tobacco control measures.
3.4 Parties should not accept support or endorse any
offer for assistance or proposed tobacco control legislation
or policy drafted by or in collaboration with the tobacco
industry.
Recommendations 3.1-3.3 urge Parties to formally es-
chew industry efforts to pre-empt statutory regulation
though partnerships and other forms of strategic volun-
tary or self-regulation which fill regulatory space, reduce
political support for strong marketing and tax policies,
and foster closer relationships between industry and pol-
icy actors. Few Parties appear to have formal protocols
prohibiting these voluntary measures (Additional file 1:
Table S8). Parties’ responses to the additional questions
(which ask whether Parties have entered into partnerships,
non-binding, non-enforceable, or voluntary arrangements
with the industry and whether they are aware of any
youth, public education, or other initiatives related to to-
bacco control) are consistent with a greater incidence of
informal working norms (Additional file 1: Table S8).
However, it is not clear whether this is a function of self-
selection bias (Parties with stronger records on Article 5.3
being more likely to submit responses to the questions) or
whether Parties’ responses take into account partnerships
and voluntary arrangements relating to the illicit trade in
tobacco. If not, the potential for focus-shifting opportun-
ities is likely to be significant [110].
By urging Parties to refuse offers for assistance in re-
spect of proposed tobacco control legislation or policy
drafted by (or in collaboration with) the tobacco indus-
try, recommendation 3.4 seeks to shield policymakers
from poor quality information which ostensibly appears
to reduce the costs associated with developing tobacco
control policies [17]. Stronger, formal methods (n = 12)
are put into effect through primary and secondary legis-
lation, and administrative measures (Additional file 1:
Table S9). Informal methods – which are susceptible to
temporal opportunities for policy influence – include
working norms (n = 11) and ad hoc actions (n = 7). The
degree of specification of formal protocols varies
considerably, which may affect their value to policy ac-
tors seeking to rely on them to ensure offers of assist-
ance are rejected (see Nepal’s Tobacco Product Control
and Regulatory Directive [111] for an example of a
highly specified approach). Only 4 Parties explicitly ex-
tend their protocols to third parties (Additional file 1:
Table S9), while fewer still (n = 2) have drafted formal
protocols that explicitly extend to non-health ministries
(Additional file 1: Table S9); creating both agent and
venue-based risks of policy influence [41].
Managing and making transparent individual conflicts of
interest (recommendations 4.4, 4.6, 4.8, 4.9, 4.10)
Engagement in occupational activity within the tobacco
industry after leaving service
4.4 Parties should develop clear policies that require pub-
lic office holders who have or have had a role in setting
and implementing public health policies with respect to
tobacco control to inform their institutions about any
intention to engage in an occupational activity within the
tobacco industry, whether gainful or not, within a speci-
fied period of time after leaving service.
Recommendation 4.4 seeks to reduce the impact of
the “revolving door” phenomenon by requiring officials
to disclose any intention to work within the industry
once leaving public service. Offers of employment have
the potential to affect current policy-making through the
promise of future financial inducements [112], by enhan-
cing insider knowledge of policy-making [113], and by
increasing industry access to policymakers through per-
sonal ties [114]. In practice, some measures (nParties = 7)
require policy actors to disclose future employment
plans, but most focus on imposing post-employment re-
strictions: prohibiting policy actors from taking up cer-
tain forms of employment within a specified period of
time (cooling-off provisions) (nParties = 27) or from
lobbying (nParties = 3).
Most in-post disclosure obligations have basic drafting
flaws which provide scope for industry tactical and
venue adaption. Not all apply to senior policymakers (such
as ministers (nParties = 6) or heads of state (nParties = 3))
who have the institutional power to act as veto players in
health policy-making, and few apply across all levels of
policy-making (nParties = 2). Although most measures that
impose post-employment restrictions apply across public
administration (91%, nParties = 27) they are subject to simi-
lar weaknesses, which limit the extent they can curtail em-
ployment as a means of policy influence. Few cooling-off
provisions, for example, apply to senior policy actors
(ministers (48%); heads of state (34%)). Fewer still (24%)
apply across all levels of policy-making (heads of state,
ministers, elected representatives, and civil servants).
Selective application is compounded by: the absence of
disclosure obligations for cooling-off provisions (which
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apply to just 24% of policy actors subject to such provi-
sions); short cooling-off periods of 6 months for some
policy actors (nPolicy Actors = 7); narrow restrictions on
the types of employment (e.g. board membership) (nPolicy
Actors = 11) and types of employers (e.g. those that have
been “controlled” or “regulated” by policy actors) (nPolicy
Actors = 25) that give rise to cooling-off periods. Just 5 Par-
ties apply comprehensive cooling-off periods (more than
6 months, across all levels of policy-making and not
unduly restricted to specific types of employment or em-
ployers) or in-post disclosure requirements which apply
across all levels of policy-making.
Declaration and divestment of direct interests in the
tobacco industry and excluding tobacco industry employees
from health policy-making
4.6 Parties should require government officials to declare
and divest themselves of direct interests in the tobacco
industry.
4.8 Parties should not allow any person employed by
the tobacco industry or any entity working to further its
interests to be a member of any government body, com-
mittee or advisory group that sets or implements tobacco
control or public health policy.
4.9 Parties should not nominate any person employed
by the tobacco industry or any entity working to further
its interests to serve on delegations to meetings of the
Conference of the Parties, its subsidiary bodies or any
other bodies established pursuant to decisions of the Con-
ference of the Parties.
Recommendation 4.6 urges Parties to require public
officials to declare and divest themselves of “direct inter-
ests in the tobacco industry”: a broadly defined term
which, in principle, extends to firm and share ownership
as well as various forms of secondary employment, such
as board, management and advisory roles. The recom-
mendation overlaps with, and reinforces, two further
recommendations which are not restricted to public offi-
cials: recommendation 4.8, which seeks to prevent in-
dustry employees (and those working to further their
interests) from sitting on government bodies that set or
implement public health policy; and recommendation
4.9 which seeks to extend a similar protection to inter-
national policy-making by discouraging Parties from
nominating industry actors from serving on delegations
to meetings of the Conference of the Parties, its subsid-
iary bodies or other bodies established pursuant to its
decisions. A key difference between recommendation 4.6
and recommendations 4.8 and 4.9 is that the latter cover
non-public employees who may participate in policy-
making on a less formal basis.
Implementation of recommendations 4.6 and 4.8 is
primarily passive and codified, whereas recommendation
4.9 is typically implemented “actively” through working
norms. We identified just 11 health-based policy instru-
ments introduced in response to the FCTC relevant to
recommendations 4.6 and 4.8 (which in most cases,
nParties = 8, sit alongside measures that apply to policy-
making generally) and 1 relevant to recommendation
4.9. This may, however, underestimate active imple-
mentation of recommendation 4.8 and 4.9, which, in
contrast to recommendation 4.6, can be put into effect
on an ad hoc basis (e.g. Ghana’s actions over participa-
tion in meetings of its Tobacco Control Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee [115]). This is implied by Parties’
answers to the additional questions, which indicate that
observance of recommendation 4.8 and 4.9 through work-
ing norms and ad hoc actions may be relatively widespread.
Health-based policy instruments covering recommen-
dation 4.6 and 4.8 tend to be institutionally selective;
focusing on the membership of bodies established to
govern tobacco control policy (e.g. [116–119]). This
narrow focus creates an enabling environment for hori-
zontal and vertical venue-based opportunities for policy
influence. In 2010, for example, the tobacco industry’s
participation in Latvia’s State Committee on Restriction
of Smoking was prohibited by statute [120, 121]. At the
same time, however, someone with links to Philip Mor-
ris is reported to work in the Department of Taxation
Policy based in the Ministry of Finance [122]. Despite
this, obligations relating to the objects of divestment in
health-based instruments are broadly defined in most
cases (Kenya’s Tobacco Control Act [2007], for example,
prohibits members of the country’s Tobacco Control
Board from being “directly or indirectly…affiliated to the
tobacco industry or its subsidiaries”) and accompanied by
disclosure requirements [116].
Policy instruments that apply across public administra-
tion, and which are consistent with recommendations
4.6, 4.8 and 4.9, work by imposing restrictions and pro-
hibitions on policy actors’ external interests: specifically,
stock holdings/firm ownership, board membership, em-
ployment as a company officer, acting as a firm advisor,
and general secondary employment. These instruments
sustain an accommodating environment for conflicts of
interests for several reasons. First, they are usually re-
stricted to public employees, and, therefore, do not cover
industry actors who may contribute to health policy-
making on a more informal basis. Second, because they
develop in a piecemeal way, consolidated instruments
that apply to all public and elected officials are relatively
rare. As a result, the percentage of Parties with policy in-
struments that cover heads of state, ministers, elected
representatives, and civil servants is relatively low (≥43%
for all interests covered) (see Fig. 4). Third, the full range
of external interests that may give rise to conflicts of inter-
ests are rarely covered. In some cases, for example, prohi-
bitions only extend to professional activities, managing
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businesses, paid employment, or company stock holdings,
or particular modes of stock holding. This is illustrated by
Fig. 5 which shows that strong provisions extending to the
full range of interests only apply in 32% of cases for minis-
ters, 28% for heads of state, 22% for civil servants, and
21% for elected representatives. Finally, in some cases re-
strictions on stockholdings are subject to provisos and
qualifications. Armenia’s law on the Civil Service (2001),
for instance, requires civil servants to pass control of
stocks in a commercial organization to entrusted manage-
ment (which does not affect the officials’ right to receive
income from the property) where his or her share in the
company exceeds 10%.
Prohibition of gifts, services and benefits
4.10 Parties should not allow any official or employee of
government or of any semi/quasi-governmental body to
accept payments, gifts or services, monetary or in-kind,
from the tobacco industry.
Recommendation 4.10 urges Parties to prohibit gov-
ernment officials and employees from accepting gifts,
payments and services (hereafter gifts) of any kind from
the tobacco industry. Measures that specifically target
tobacco industry gifts are uncommon (nParties = 3) and,
in practice, simply reproduce existing measures intro-
duced independently of the FCTC that apply across public
administration [73, 123]. Passive implementation is more
common (nParties = 61), but measures are characterised by
exemptions, provisos, and qualifications which provide
ample scope for industry tactical adaption. Potential veto
players, for example, are commonly excluded [heads of
state, 44% (nParties = 27); ministers, 20% (nParties =13)].
Equally, some measures impose monetary thresholds on
the value of gifts that can lawfully be accepted [heads of
states (nParties =9); ministers (nParties = 11); civil servants
Fig. 4 Policy Instruments restricting public officials’ external interests (by policy actors covered)
Fig. 5 Policy Instruments restricting public officials’ external interests (by restrictions on interests imposed)
Fooks et al. Globalization and Health  (2017) 13:12 Page 12 of 20
(nParties =11)]. Limits are typically set quite low (e.g. US$8
in Croatia), but higher thresholds (e.g. Mongolia, monthly
salary of the public official; Georgia, 5% of public officials’
annual income; Turkey, 10 times the salary of government
ministers) are likely to have little impact on tobacco com-
panies’ capacity to use personal gifts as a lawful means of
influencing policymakers’ decision-making. Exemptions
are also common [heads of states (nParties = 8); ministers
(nParties = 11); civil servants (nParties = 12)], which in some
cases can appear quite significant (in Palau, for example,
wedding gifts, customary gifts and gifts exchanged be-
tween individuals on birthdays, holidays and other similar
occasions are permitted provided the gifts exchanged are
not substantially disproportionate in value).
Managing Institutional Conflicts of Interest: Political
Financing (Recommendations 4.11)
4.11 Taking into account national law and constitutional
principles, Parties should have effective measures to pro-
hibit contributions from the tobacco industry or any en-
tity working to further its interests to political parties,
candidates or campaigns, or to require full disclosure of
such contributions.
Recommendation 4.11 covers political financing. It urges
Parties to either prohibit businesses in the tobacco supply
chain (or those working to further their interests) from fi-
nancing political parties, candidates, or campaigns or
require their full disclosure. Although uncommon (nParties
= 3), measures that target tobacco industry political finan-
cing are comprehensive, banning contributions to both
parties and candidates [124–127]. By contrast, measures
that apply generally to political funding (nParties = 89) com-
monly fall short of comprehensive implementation.
Although 50 Parties have measures in place that impose
restrictions on political contributions, only 30 prohibit
contributions to both parties and candidates, which pro-
vides tobacco companies with functional-based opportun-
ities for influence by extending funding to candidates
where party financing is prohibited and vice-versa. Fur-
ther, bans typically work by either limiting political fund-
ing to natural persons (individuals) or prohibiting legal
persons - such as companies - from financing parties and
candidates. They do not, as such, cover donations from in-
dividual shareholders or other natural persons who may
wish to promote the interests of businesses in the tobacco
supply chain. Disclosure requirements, which require par-
ties and/or candidates to report on political donations, are
typically in place where prohibitions on corporate funding
are absent or not comprehensive (nParties = 56). However,
these can represent a poor resource for industry monitor-
ing if parties permit anonymous donations (e.g. Sweden),
set monetary thresholds on disclosure (nParties = 29), or do
not make reports public (nParties = 8).
Reducing the political impacts of corporate social
responsibility (Recommendations 6.2-6.4, Article 13)
6.2 Parties should not endorse support form partnerships
with or participate in activities of the tobacco industry
described as socially responsible.
6.3 Parties should not allow public disclosure by the
tobacco industry or any other person acting on its behalf
of activities described as socially responsible or of the ex-
penditures made for these activities except when legally
required to report on such expenditures such as in an an-
nual report.
6.4 Parties should not allow acceptance by any branch
of government or the public sector of political social
Financial educational community or other contributions
from the tobacco industry or from those working to fur-
ther its interests except for compensations due to legal
settlements or mandated by law or legally binding and
enforceable agreements.
Article 13 Each Party shall, in accordance with its con-
stitution or constitutional principles, undertake a com-
prehensive ban of all tobacco advertising, promotion and
sponsorship.
In addition to urging Parties to raise awareness of the
underlying political purpose of tobacco industry CSR
programmes (see above), and providing recommenda-
tions regarding partnerships and voluntary initiatives
(see above), the guidelines contain a number of further
recommendations that explicitly aim to reduce the polit-
ical impacts of such programmes. Recommendations 6.2
and 6.4 aim to manage industry-government engagement
over CSR by urging Parties not to support or endorse
industry CSR activities (6.2) and preventing industry
actors from providing CSR related contributions to the
public sector (6.4). Recommendation 6.3 aims to reduce
the agenda setting effect of industry CSR programmes by
preventing public disclosure of industry CSR activities and
expenditures. In addition, Article 13 requires Parties to
ban all forms of sponsorship which, by virtue of sub-
section 1(g) of the Article, includes financial and in-kind
contributions to community, health, welfare and environ-
mental organizations.
Policy instruments at the national level that explicitly
target industry CSR programmes are relatively rare and
vary in their coverage. Nepal [111] has a series of over-
lapping measures in place which collectively appear to
ban industry CSR programmes by prohibiting manufac-
turers and “related parties” from offering “financial, ma-
terial and structural assistance” and prohibiting industry
assistance and collaboration offered in the name of edu-
cational development, ethnic or social class advancement
and support for emergency services. Ecuador [128] and
Thailand [129] have also legislated to ban CSR publicity
(6.3) and prohibit government organizations from
accepting industry donations (6.4) and, by implication,
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observe recommendation 6.2. Brazil has measures in
place that prohibit members of CONICQ from accepting
funding from the tobacco sector and participating in
events sponsored by the industry [130]. Suriname [131]
and Bangladesh [132] prohibit the use of company and
product names, symbols, and trademarks in the context
of industry CSR programmes. Public sector organiza-
tions in the Philippines are required to disseminate in-
formation about the underlying purpose and scope of
industry CSR initiatives [73]. Serbia’s Ministry of Health
has a policy of not accepting donations and sponsorship
from the industry [119]. The Russian Federation pro-
hibits the use of trade names, trademarks and service
marks as well as commercial designations belonging to
tobacco organizations in the organization and imple-
mentation of charitable activities [133].
In practice, formal restraints on industry CSR activities
take effect through restrictions on industry sponsorship,
awards, donations, and scholarships (hereafter sponsor-
ship unless otherwise stated) in line with Article 13. The
degree to which these efforts overlap with the guidelines
and restrict industry CSR varies considerably. Some Par-
ties (e.g. Bahrain [134], Djibouti [71], Lao [135], Togo
[136]) have prohibited sponsorships outright in respect
of all activities, irrespective of whether company names
or product trademarks or names are associated with the
sponsorship. This approach implies a ban on publicity
and largely eliminates the industry’s capacity to use CSR
politically. However, it is more common for Parties to
impose weaker or more equivocal restrictions on spon-
sorship, which may permit continued use of CSR by the
industry as a means of policy influence, albeit under lim-
ited circumstances (Additional file 1: Table S10).
Some Parties impose de facto publicity bans on prod-
uct and corporate sponsorship by prohibiting the use of
product trademarks and names, company names, trade-
marks, symbols, and logos (Additional file 1: Table S10).
Prohibition of the use of these restricts effective publi-
city for CSR, and prevents tobacco companies from
using CSR as means of enhancing their reputation. How-
ever, it may not affect non-publicised forms of CSR,
which can facilitate access and build higher trust rela-
tionships with policy actors, enhance companies’ status
as a source of credible information with policymakers,
and, potentially, build and strengthen constituencies
supportive of their position on health policy [24, 27–29,
44, 45, 87]. Indeed, some Parties explicitly make excep-
tions for such CSR initiatives. Section 11 of the Cook
Islands’ Tobacco Act (2007), for example, allows indus-
try actors to support events and organizations, provided
association with tobacco companies, products, or brands
is “limited to private correspondence” [126]. Further,
other Parties (Additional file 1: Table S10) only prohibit
the use of product trademarks and names or limit
restrictions on sponsorships to circumstances where
their purpose is to market or otherwise induce the use
of tobacco products, which may permit tobacco manu-
facturers greater latitude in using CSR politically by per-
mitting corporate publicity (unless otherwise specified)
(Additional file 1: Table S10). In some circumstances this
is made explicit. South Africa’s Tobacco Products Con-
trol Act (1993), for example, preserves the lawfulness of
charitable financial contributions and sponsorship, “pro-
vided that such contribution or sponsorship is not for
the purpose of advertisement.” [137].
Other countries restrict CSR activities to certain issues,
such as hunger eradication, poverty reduction, humanitar-
ian activities, social welfare, and the prevention and con-
trol of natural disasters [138] but explicitly forbid the
industry from publicising these activities in the mass
media (Additional file 1: Table S10). By contrast, other
Parties restrict prohibition of sponsorship to certain activ-
ities such as entertainment, sport, recreational, educa-
tional, commercial and cultural purposes and events and
activities aimed at minors, leaving open sponsorship for
other social issues, such as poverty reduction and health
related initiatives (Additional file 1: Table S10).
Discussion
Despite most Parties reporting some action to imple-
ment Article 5.3, our findings indicate that, in practice,
implementation is weak and creates extensive opportun-
ities for continued industry policy influence. These op-
portunities primarily arise from three common features
of implementation. First, Parties take a highly selective
approach to implementing specific guideline recommen-
dations: only 6% of Parties that have taken some action
under Article 5.3 have implemented over half the recom-
mendations. Second, Parties rely heavily on pre-existing
policy instruments (passive implementation) governing
conflicts of interest in public administration, political fi-
nancing and lobbying restrictions. These commonly fail
to cover all policy actors, frequently omit senior policy
actors, and are characterised by exemptions, qualifica-
tions, and provisos: all of which create extensive space
for continued industry influence. Third, measures intro-
duced in direct response to the FCTC frequently fail to
extend beyond health departments, or include third par-
ties in prohibitions and restrictions on industry political
activity, or take into account tobacco companies’ capacity
to shift the substantive focus of their political activity
(from, for instance, youth smoking prevention to the illicit
trade in tobacco products).
The policy risks associated with these features are exac-
erbated by several other characteristics of implementation.
These include Parties’ systematic neglect of recommenda-
tions that facilitate industry monitoring, which increases
the extent to which agent-based opportunities can be used
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without effective scrutiny. Equally, in many cases imple-
mentation demonstrates a lack of joined up thinking,
which can further diminish the limited effects of selective
action. There is, for instance, less merit in awareness rais-
ing measures if parties do not have substantive measures
in place to exclude industry actors from health policy-
making. Likewise, measures which nominally apply to third
parties, are likely to have less effect where actors are not
required to disclose their links to tobacco manufacturers.
Finally, a number of Parties implement guideline recom-
mendations through working norms. These lack clarity
and bureaucratic authority, are easier to challenge than co-
dified working practices, and may leave implementation
susceptible to changes in political administration [139].
Relatively widespread misreporting in Party reports
suggests that many public officials have a weak under-
standing of Article 5.3. The fact that some Parties recog-
nise the risks associated with weak implementation also
suggests that implementing Article 5.3 may be seen as a
low priority by some states [41, 135, 140]. More import-
antly, Parties’ patchy approach to implementation is pre-
mised on a fundamental misunderstanding of how
tobacco companies seek to influence policy. The fact
that partial implementation limits the universe of possi-
bilities for tobacco companies does not necessarily imply
reduced influence. In 2000, for example, industry actors’
ability to access the Prime Minister’s Office in the UK,
appeared to weaken health policy even when denied ac-
cess to other departments [29]. Party reports also sug-
gest that tobacco companies simply lobby more senior
policy actors, where restrictions apply to junior officials
[135]. Moreover, the number of residual opportunities
for policy influence deepens policy risks. Recent research
illustrates how tobacco companies in the UK seek to ex-
ploit all available opportunities to influence health policy
[141]. This heterogeneous quality of political action [18]
suggests that gaps in implementation have a cumulative
and mutually reinforcing effect on the industry’s ability
to build consensus within government and legislatures
against policy change. The apparent continuing suscepti-
bility of elected representatives to industry influence is a
case in point. [142] In the context of weak implementa-
tion of conflict-of-interest provisions [143–147], this
permits tobacco companies to build relationships with
elected representatives through hospitality and other
means [148], which reinforces their efforts to apply pol-
itical pressure through constituencies in the tobacco
supply chain [142]. Finally, the fact that opportunities
for policy influence are interdependent, and have the po-
tential to create additional channels of influence, sug-
gests that the type of opportunities left open by partial
implementation is also important. These additional
channels can expedite relatively subtle changes of em-
phasis in industry political activity. Partnerships between
government and the industry on tobacco tax policy and
the illicit trade in tobacco products, for example, can
facilitate a range of venue, function, and agent based op-
portunities for policy influence by facilitating reliance on
industry data, closer co-operation between industry ac-
tors and government officials, and increased access to
policy actors [50, 149–154]. More to the point, they can
also facilitate paradigmatic changes in political action.
Access to officials involved in brokering trade policy, for
example, can shape trade and investment agreements
which, in addition to creating new and potentially
powerful venues for policy influence by expanding to-
bacco companies’ access to investor-state dispute settle-
ment procedures [36, 51], can also enable tactical shifts
in how the industry lobbies [22, 155].
This last example highlights opportunities for policy
influence facilitated by gaps in the guidelines (which do
not explicitly address trade and investment agreements)
which arise from venue creation. Another important gap
concerns Parties’ increasing use of mandatory stake-
holder consultations and regulatory impact assessments.
Tobacco companies played a key role in embedding both
in EU policymaking [54] and continue to lobby trade offi-
cials to include them in trade and investment agreements
[51]. Stakeholder consultation creates a horizontal, venue-
based opportunity for policy influence which circumvents
restrictions on government-industry interactions and
facilitates agent and functional-based opportunities by
opening up the policy process to third parties funded
by tobacco companies who draw on reports funded by
tobacco companies in their submissions [90, 91, 156].
Finally, the recommendations do not directly cover outsider
political strategies [34, 157, 158]. Transparency provisions
in the guidelines may help to monitor such strategies, but
these are overlooked by the majority of Parties.
Conclusions
The findings underline the importance of Parties taking
an active and whole-of-government approach to Article
5.3 implementation [21], including measures that expli-
citly cover third parties. There is also a clear case for
revisiting the guidelines. Industry political activity is
mutable and capable of adapting to altered politico-
institutional conditions. Emerging evidence indicates
that the guidelines need to take account of innovations
in political activity that centre on Better Regulation
practices [54, 90–92], and trade and investment agree-
ments [48, 51]. Introducing general duties (in conjunc-
tion with specific measures) may partly address this
phenomenon, particularly where they apply to policy ac-
tors across government [71]. Effective implementation of
Article 5.3 also requires Parties to codify the full range
of guideline recommendations in administrative measures
or legislation. Specific consideration should be given to
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obligations on tobacco industry actors, in accordance with
recommendations 5.2 and 5.3, to submit information con-
cerning their political activities. This would enhance ef-
fective industry monitoring, and allow health officials and
CSOs to accurately track the industry’s response to restric-
tions on political activity. Parties may also consider intro-
ducing legislative/regulatory footprints, which mandate
disclosure of contacts by public and elected officials with
stakeholders, and any supporting materials provided by
lobbyists [109]. Ideally, this should be a live document,
which would help CSOs scrutinise policy-making in
real time [109].
There are several pathways to achieving these changes.
Parties may consider establishing inter-ministerial bodies
aimed at facilitating a whole-of-government approach to
implementing the guidelines. Participants must have suf-
ficient institutional capital to push through consequen-
tial reforms. [123, 159] CSOs and scholars should also
inform public officials of the policy risks attendant on
isolated efforts to prohibit or manage specific forms of
political activity. Evaluated in terms of its present imple-
mentation by Parties, Article 5.3 is largely an expression
of symbolic politics [160, 161]. However, as one of sev-
eral similar documents adopted at sessions of the Con-
ference of the Parties (COP), the governing body of the
FCTC, there is agreement that the guidelines constitute
a subsequent agreement under Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 [162] and,
therefore, should be taken into account by Parties in
interpreting their obligations under Article 5.3. The pre-
amble to the guidelines, which states that Parties are
“encouraged” to implement them and that their aim is
to “assist Parties in meeting their legal obligations”
under the Convention, emphasises the non-binding sta-
tus of the guidelines. Nonetheless, the FCTC’s structure
(a primary agreement outlining general principles parti-
cularised by detailed guidelines for implementation) and
other comments in the guidelines, which encourage Par-
ties to implement measures beyond those outlined, argu-
ably indicates that effective implementation of Article
5.3 not only requires Parties to adopt the guideline rec-
ommendations in full, but that this represents the mini-
mum necessary step to giving effect to the Article [24].
Given this, Article 5.3 represents a powerful vehicle
around which CSOs and public health professionals
could coalesce to advocate material changes in policy.
Our findings suggest that this may only occur when the
importance of Article 5.3 implementation is more widely
recognised and systematically integrated into general ef-
forts aimed at building capacity for successful FCTC im-
plementation [39, 163]. To this end, training on Article
5.3 and its implementation, which takes account of the
findings of the present study, is essential [164], as is a
deeper understanding that Article 5.3 implementation
is an active political process, which necessitates the
long term commitment of resources by the WHO, Par-
ties and CSOs.
This last observation is highly relevant to the work of
CSOs advocating similar measures be applied to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change [165–168]. The findings presented here are also
of relevance to other areas of public health such as alcohol
and food, despite the absence of a framework convention
in these areas. Article 5.3 and its guidelines are a conse-
quence of sustained analysis and advocacy concerning the
socially suboptimal effects of corporate political activity.
Translating the findings of this work to detailed guidelines
represents an important first step in creating an inter-
national political consensus around the value of restricting
corporate influence in policy-making and the measures
that can be taken to reduce it. However, the findings of
this study highlight that this represents a necessary, but
not sufficient condition, of effective policy change, that
effective implementation and enforcement requires sus-
tained pressure from advocates, health professionals,
and lawyers (as well as strong public support), and that
internationally agreed frameworks for implementation
need to be understood as open and flexible documents
which are responsive to innovations in corporate political
activity.
Finally, our findings underline the importance of further
research exploring the effects of strong implementation of
Article 5.3 on general FCTC implementation; the political,
cultural and institutional barriers to Article 5.3 implemen-
tation; the role of CSOs and other policy entrepreneurs in
facilitating Article 5.3 implementation; and the effect of
tobacco industry political innovation on health policy. In
addition to the kinds of methods used in this article, such
research might make effective use of in-depth country-
level case studies and key-informant interviews, in order
to better understand the processes by which implementa-
tion does, or does not, take place [169].
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